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What is the secret of Putin's popularity in 00-08 and why does he have no chance of becoming popular now?

It's just that someone is lucky to rule at a time of high export prices, and someone is not. Only one unique man managed to enter the same river twice, flowing in different directions. And this is an ideal case to confirm or refute the theory - the popularity of a leader in a given territory has always depended on only one thing - the prices for raw materials exported by the territory. A side conclusion from this, if Yeltsin were brought to the throne in 1999, not Putin, but, say, Nemtsov, everything would have happened again, and opposition leader Putin would have been killed on the bridge in front of the Kremlin. But let us return from unrealizable assumptions, if only to our rams. Namely - why Putin was so popular in the first decade of the 2000s and why he has no chance of returning to the past until the end of the 20s Everything is perfectly simple. The popularity of this or that figure among the population of Russia is directly related to the income of the population. It seems to be a simple thing, but there are idiots who deny it. If during the period of the bullish cycle in raw materials from 2000 to 2010, oil prices grew, more and more currency came to the country, and some of it somehow ended up in the wallets of Russian citizens, it is obvious that the popularity of the ruler also grew. Moreover, Mr Putin committed an irreparable stupidity in 2008. He should have resigned from the post of President of Russia and never returned to it. Indeed, then he could have remained the most popular leader of the country, probably over the past 100 years, for sure. Because the term of his two cadences ideally fell into the bullish cycle of raw materials, in which the welfare of Russian citizens only grew. nfortunately, "Baba Yaga was against" and Putin made the main mistake of his life - he returned to the presidency of Russia in 2012. In order to never leave. This was followed by the extension of the term of office first to 6 years, then to white slippers. And all would be fine, the people would have swallowed this, as they did before, but then suddenly the raw material cycles were fed up. A long 20 year bear cycle has begun in raw materials. And accordingly, the life of Russian citizens began to deteriorate. Realizing this in 2013, after a hot protest winter in spring 2012, Putin decided to arrange CrimeaNASH. And I must say, he succeeded. Tactically, he won. And Crimea was not the main acquisition. It was just fools running around with flags of the Crimea and all that. This is clearly seen from the fact that until now, in words being Russian territory, most Russian financial and technical giants, such as Sberbank and others, do not work in Crimea, and cellular communication is carried out as in roaming, that is, abroad. And this despite the fact that only a few countries recognized Crimea as Russian, and in general it does not seem to bother Putin much. The goal was different. Stop the decline in the leader's popularity, which would obviously sooner or later lead to another "orange revolution" in Moscow. The problem is, as I said, Putin is a great tactician but a lousy strategist. Having solved the problem in 2014, he did not eliminate, and could not eliminate the main reasons that lead to the end of his reign. He has no control over oil prices. He cannot feed the entire Russian people with bread and fish. And there is less and less bread, and the mouths of his companions are wider, and there is not enough for everyone. You will laugh, but for example it looks like Furgal's arrest is a consequence of a narrowing clearing for feeding. By 2016, a frightening trend was evident. I don't know if she scares him, but she should. The real disposable income of Russians is steadily falling. Fall every year. Almost without interruption. This means that the population as a whole is becoming impoverished, which means that dissatisfaction with the authorities is growing in it. Real disposable cash income of the population is cash income minus obligatory payments (taxes and fees, interest on loans, and so on), adjusted for inflation. Most Zaputins like to trump with absolute numbers. They say, how incomes are falling, if according to Rosstat data in absolute terms the wages are growing! They forget that income depends, among other things, on taxes, inflation, and so on. And then fucked up is drawn. In the second quarter alone, they fell by 8% in annual terms, according to Rosstat. Proof This is a record drop since 1999. That is almost the same as at the end of the previous bearish cycle in commodities. And until the end of the cycle, at least another 8-10 years. Upcoming changes to history Translation history will soon only be available when you are signed in and will be centrally managed within My Activity. Past history will be cleared during this upgrade, so make sure to save translations you want to remember for ease of access later. English Pravda Rosstat provides data on quarterly changes in the indicator since 2005. Since this year, there has been no drop in real income as deep as it is now: the largest reductions were observed in the fourth quarter of 2008 (-6.1% YoY), the third quarter of 2015 and the fourth quarter of 2016 (-5.6%) ... From 2000 to 2005, real disposable cash incomes grew steadily at a high rate in annual terms, which allows us to conclude that there was no strong decline by quarters (+ 12% in 2000, + 8.7% in 2001, + 11.1% in 2002, + 14.9% in 2003, + 9.9% in 2004, + 12.4% in 2005). Thus, the last time the real disposable income of Russians fell more strongly in 1999: then, at the end of the year, the fall was 12.3%. Rosstat's estimate was at variance with economists' forecasts, which had predicted a double-digit drop in real disposable money income in April-June 2020. Experts from the Center for Development Institute of the Higher School of Economics estimated the decline in the second quarter by 18% in annual terms, while economists from the state corporation VEB.RF - by 17.5%. In the same period, unemployment began to rise. That is, not only are the mandatory taxes and fees increasing, Putin is absolutely not soared about raising taxes even during a pandemic, when other countries were engaged in direct distribution of money to the population, but more and more citizens are losing their jobs. In fact, this is a double blow. That is why, by the way, Nabiullina is so earnestly fighting inflation, because if inflation were still growing, there would be a perfect storm. What are the conclusions from all that has been said? First, the theory of the correspondence between the popularity of the leaders of the USSR and Russia is correct, because it is omnipotent. This is confirmed empirically by observing real life. Secondly, President Putin will continue to lose his popularity, and any of his moves like CrimeaNASH can cause only a short-term effect, or, on the contrary, lead to the opposite result. Which is even more likely, since the protests of 2012 were backed by the very recently fat years 2000-2008. Behind future protests will be hungry years 2014-2020. President Putin is most likely to lose power before the end of the 20s. Voluntarily or not, it doesn't really matter to history. I will repeat my prediction from 2014, a new perestroika and new 90s are inevitable. Perhaps more bloody than the first, since there is an obvious stratification in society between those who profit from the crisis and are able to support the detachments of Tonton Macoutes, and those who are impoverished at an accelerated pace. Sooner or later, the interests of these two groups will clinch. And I do not presume to predict the nature of this collision. How to avoid such a future? Unfortunately, nothing. You can try to preserve the situation until the end of the 20s and not make sudden movements. If incomes fall, taxes should be cut to compensate for this loss. Try to neutralize external economic threats by increasing social subsidies. To take the excess profits of the rich, redistributing them in favor of the poor through a progressive tax scale, for example. Or any similar measures. Sit until a new bull cycle in the raw and enjoy all the fruits of the new currency rain. If there were real elections and democracy in the country, this would be the ideal path. Unfortunately, this is not the case, which means the system is unstable and subject to resonant vibrations. Moreover, Putin's foreign policy leads to increased economic pressure on the country, that is, the authorities themselves are making the situation worse. It is impossible to predict what event will pull the system into gear. This can be an absolutely ordinary event. For example, not delivering bread to Petrograd in 1917. Like the arrest of an unknown governor in the Far East. Anyway, any nonsense. And such an event could easily cause a collapse. Because this will be the moment when all the conditions are ready. It is important to understand when we will be close to such a situation. The continuing decline in real incomes is one such condition. It leads to an explosion.