Karabakh war as a consequence of the policy of depriving Russia of gas sales markets

In 2020, an event took place that no one seems to be considering from the point of view of relations on the European gas market. Against the background of the weakening of Russia's positions in the economy, and this is exactly the case - Russia's GDP has been growing since 1991 by an average of only 0.4% per year, Western countries and Asian exporters of blue fuel have a desire to take away part of the market from the Russian gas monopolist at lightning speed. Late Putin's Russia itself, which is tightly occupied at this moment with attempts to punish the obstinate Ukraine by stopping transit through its territory, seems to have missed this important moment. Or maybe the tired President Putin has lost his grip. Turkey, a NATO member, last year quickly helped Azerbaijan resolve the decades-old conflict in Karabakh. Moreover, this was done so quickly and so devastatingly that the officials in the Kremlin simply could not oppose anything to it. And the presence of Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh now does not change anything in this sense. But what happened immediately after that? Surprisingly, the leader of Azerbaijan does not put pressure on the Armenian residents in Karabakh and does not try to put too much pressure on Armenia, as on the defeated side. Moreover, both Turkey and Azerbaijan are trying to integrate Armenia, as far as possible under current conditions, into trade relations in this region. Why is this happening? English Pravda It's simple. Take a look at the map in the title of the post. The Karabakh war resolved the issue of instability near the important southern gas corridor - the TANAP gas pipeline - which takes away most of Gazprom's market in southern Europe. At the beginning of 2021, three events took place on the gas market of Southeast Europe that will have long-term implications for Gazprom's business in the region and in the EU market as a whole. Russian media broadly covered only one of them: on January 1, Serbian President Aleksandr Vucic solemnly launched the supply of Russian gas to his country via a new route - through Bulgaria via the Balkan Stream, which became a continuation of the second string of the Turkish Stream gas pipeline. However, a few hours earlier, on the last day of the outgoing year, Bulgaria began to receive natural gas from Azerbaijan via the Trans-Adriatic Gas Pipeline (TAP), which was completed several weeks ago. Which was launched immediately after the victory of Azerbaijan in Karabakh. An interesting coincidence - isn't it? The third New Year's event was the start of commercial operation of a new floating terminal for receiving liquefied natural gas (LNG) off the island of Krk in Croatia. The regasifier vessel (analogous to the Klaipeda Independence) received a tanker with American LNG and began pumping blue fuel into the national gas transportation system connected to the European one. So Croatia, which until now has been almost exclusively supplied by Gazprom, will now be able not only to diversify its suppliers, but also to act as a gas exporter, for example, to Hungary and Ukraine. To assess the significance of these three events for Gazprom and their likely consequences for gas supplies from Russia to Europe, let us turn to the export statistics of the Russian parastatal company. Let's take the data for 2019, since the last year's performance due to the coronavirus pandemic and the global economic crisis can hardly be considered particularly indicative. The largest buyers of Russian gas in the Balkan Peninsula in 2019, according to the Gazprom website, were Croatia (2.82 billion cubic meters), Greece (2.41 billion cubic meters) and Bulgaria (2.39 billion cubic meters). m). Serbia (2.13 billion cubic meters) is in fourth place in the region. The design capacity of the now commissioned Croatian LNG terminal is 2.6 billion cubic meters. m per year. Thus, Croatia literally overnight acquired the theoretical opportunity to almost completely abandon Gazprom's services. Let me remind you that this is another EU country that plans to do this. In the last few years alone, this has been done by Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. All of them sharply reduced purchases from Gazprom. Kommersant English Hungary is a very important sales market for Gazprom. In 2019, the company sold 11.26 billion cubic meters to this country. m. It is to Hungary, and from there to Austria, where the Baumgarten gas hub, key for Russian exports, should go the overwhelming part of the gas that Russia plans to pump through the second line of the Turkish Stream intended for Europe with a capacity of 15.75 billion cubic meters. m. As long as Gazprom will supply the Hungarian market, as before, with transit through Ukraine, only from now on Russian gas will have to compete in this market with supplies from Croatia. According to Croatiaweek, the capacity of the LNG terminal near the island of Krk is fully booked for the next three years, 80% leased until 2027 and about 50% until 2035. Translation types Text translation Source text Yesli nachalo kommercheskoy ekspluatatsii etogo SPG-terminala oznachayet dlya "Gazproma" utratu monopol'nogo polozheniya v Khorvatii i usileniye konkurentsii v Vengrii, to v rezul'tate puska tak nazyvayemogo Yuzhnogo gazovogo koridora rossiyskiy postavshchik lishilsya monopol'nogo polozheniya v Bolgarii i stolknetsya teper' s rostom konkurentsii v Gretsii, a takzhe Italii. Prichem borot'sya v dannom sluchaye pridetsya ne so szhizhennym gazom iz, predpolozhim, Katara, Alzhira ili SSHA, a s boleye vygodnym truboprovodnym gazom iz Azerbaydzhana. Yuzhnyy gazovyy koridor - eto sistema dvukh truboprovodov. Voshedshiy v stroy yeshche v 2019 godu TANAP dostavlyayet idushcheye iz Azerbaydzhana cherez Gruziyu goluboye toplivo po vsey territorii Turtsii do granitsy s Gretsiyey. Tam on soyedinen s voshedshim teper' v stroy gazoprovodom TAP, kotoryy po grecheskoy i albanskoy territorii, a zatem po dnu Adriaticheskogo morya idet v Italiyu. Moshchnost' TAP - 10 mlrd kub. m v god, iz kotorykh 8 mlrd kub. m prednaznacheny dlya glavnogo pokupatelya azerbaydzhanskogo gaza v Yevrosoyuze, Italii. A ved' Italiya yavlyayetsya vtorym po vazhnosti posle Germanii rynkom "Gazproma" v YES, v 2019 godu kompaniya postavila v etu stranu 22,1 mlrd kub. m. Teoreticheski posle vvoda v deystviye Transadriaticheskogo gazoprovoda spros na goluboye toplivo iz Rossii mozhet snizit'sya primerno na tret'. No yeshche bol'shuyu ugrozy dlya Gazproma neset podklyucheniye Turkmenii k gazoprovodu TANAP cherez postroyku transkaspiyskogo gazoprovoda. Seychas turkmenskiy gaz prodayet Rossiya, kotoraya srazu zhe posle prisoyedineniya Turkmenii k etomu gazoprovodu ostanetsya i bez sredstvot prodazhi turkmenskogo gaza no i okonchatel'no poteryayet gazovyy rynok yuzhnoy Yevropy. Srazu zhe posle etogo budut zabyty problemy Rossii s Ukrainoy - u rossiyskogo gazovogo monopolista poyavyatsya takiye problemy, chto Putinu ili yego nasledniku uzhe budet ne do Ukrainy. Itak chto zhe my imeyem po itogam 2020 goda? Molniyenosnoye resheniye Azerbaydzhana vmeste s stranoy chlenom NATO zastarelogo voyennogo konflikta vblizi vazhnogo yuzhnogo gazovogo koridora. Aktivizatsiya slukhov o skorom podklyuchenii k etomu koridoru strany s gromadnymi zapasami gaza. Postepennoye vytesneniye Gazproma s rynka yuzhnoy yevropy. Vse eto proiskhodit na fone dymovoy zavesy vodevilya vokrug dostroyki severnogo potoka 2.0 Vy dumayete vse eto bylo sovpadeniyem? Show more 2268 / 5000 Translation results If the start of commercial operation of this LNG terminal means for Gazprom the loss of its monopoly position in Croatia and increased competition in Hungary, as a result of the launch of the so-called Southern Gas Corridor, the Russian supplier lost its monopoly position in Bulgaria and will now face increased competition in Greece, and also Italy. Moreover, in this case, you will have to fight not with liquefied gas from, say, Qatar, Algeria or the United States, but with more profitable pipeline gas from Azerbaijan. The Southern Gas Corridor is a two pipeline system. TANAP, which entered service in 2019, delivers blue fuel coming from Azerbaijan through Georgia throughout Turkey to the border with Greece. There it is connected to the TAP gas pipeline, which has now been commissioned, which goes through Greek and Albanian territory, and then along the Adriatic Sea to Italy. TAP capacity is 10 billion cubic meters. m per year, of which 8 billion cubic meters. m are intended for the main buyer of Azerbaijani gas in the European Union, Italy. But Italy is the second most important market for Gazprom in the EU after Germany, in 2019 the company supplied 22.1 billion cubic meters to this country. m. Theoretically, after the commissioning of the Trans-Adriatic gas pipeline, the demand for blue fuel from Russia may decrease by about a third. But an even greater threat to Gazprom is posed by the connection of Turkmenistan to the TANAP gas pipeline through the construction of a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Now the Turkmen gas is sold by Russia, which immediately after the accession of Turkmenistan to this gas pipeline will be left without funds from the sale of Turkmen gas but will finally lose the gas market of southern Europe. Immediately after that, the problems of Russia with Ukraine will be forgotten - the Russian gas monopoly will have such problems that Putin or his heir will no longer have time for Ukraine. So what do we have at the end of 2020? Azerbaijan’s lightning-fast solution, together with a NATO member country, to an age-old military conflict near the important southern gas corridor. Rumors about the imminent connection of a country with huge gas reserves to this corridor are intensifying. Gradual ousting of Gazprom from the southern European market. All of this takes place against the backdrop of the vaudeville smokescreen around the completion of Nord Stream 2.0. Do you think it was all a coincidence? Izvestia english